The Epic, the Novel, and Rawls
Precursors to Rawls' A Theory of Justice in Media and Philosophy
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I received the following questions from Richard Jordan in response to my article on Rawls and television. They are excellent questions and examples, which clarify several of the weaknesses in the original article. Here are the questions in full:
As you know, Rawls is just the latest in a long line of state-of-nature theorists, many of whom tend toward some blank-slate view of human nature. If the appeal of the Veil of Ignorance is driven by tv, by "a routine of technology" that hides human differences, then why did these earlier philosophies also catch on? The only answer that occurs to me is that Rawls requires more interchangeable humans than Hobbes or Locke. Is that right? And is that belief what television enabled? (No one who lived through the English Civil War could suffer the delusion that we all basically want the same things!)
Similarly, living vicariously through fiction is nothing new: one could say the same thing about novels or really any kind of extended narrative. I'm willing to buy that 20th c. television was so very canned that it succeeded in creating the illusion of a homogenous humanity, but I don't see any evidence that man "does not have empathy for the abstract other — until the invention of the television set." CS Lewis is famous for describing the ways novels allow us to inhabit other lives, Adam Smith grounds his moral theory on the ability to inhabit and anticipate generic human responses to our behaviors, Vergil enabled Romans to sympathize with Dido, and the Iliad (pace BAP) portrays Hector in such a way that no Greek could but have admired this Trojan "Other."
I will answer the second question first, because it helps with answering the first question. This question deals with vicarious empathy, which I describe in the original article:
Through the television screen, Americans could vicariously live the lives of others. Not just through the daily news, but sitcoms, documentaries, and period pieces. Sit on the couch, turn on the TV, and feel the Veil of Ignorance wash over you.
These vicarious narratives are not organic. They were constructed piecewise by producers trained to dramatically pull you in.
Richard observes:
Similarly, living vicariously through fiction is nothing new … I don't see any evidence that man "does not have empathy for the abstract other — until the invention of the television set."
I agree that the distinction between empathy for the abstract other and empathy for a concrete other is difficult to define. I might have failed to define it sufficiently in the original article. Comparing the other forms of media Richard introduces gives more color and nuance to this distinction.
I used the examples of TV (engaging with media as a main character) and social media (engaging with media as a “commenter”) as one example in the original article. Richard mentions ancient epic poems and novels, which both demonstrate more dimensions to this distinction. Epic poems in general, and the Iliad and Aenead in specific, are fantastic examples of empathy with a concrete other. They are typically told from the perspective of a messenger, relating a tale witnessed or heard from others. They take the perspective of an outsider, either in a third person perspective or a first person observer. This perspective and method builds a concrete empathy (sympathy may be a better term). Civilizations across time have been able to use art to better understand the conditions, way of life, and thought process of concrete others.
Another way to illustrate the difference between concrete and abstract empathy is by considering the experience of each. By indwelling in a main character and being conditioned to experience his or her emotional state, one assumes that their own moral instincts and habits are sufficient to “fill in the gaps” of missing context. Context doesn’t add, it takes away. Concrete empathy is the opposite. In the case of the ancients, I think the concrete empathy is contingent on the historical and personal context of the other civilization. It is assumed that the instincts and practice of the other will be shaped by different circumstances, both as a norm and by the structure of the narrative — for example, a messenger travelling to a faraway land and witnessing the story. Context identifies points of agreement, building those bridges based on specific shared traits and virtues. Context is used to add points of empathy.
Initially, these norms might reasonably appear as distinctions without a difference. I disagree, but understand why many might hold that position. Rawls himself is a great help in identifying these distinctions. Rawl’s theory of justice is a consequence of valorizing of abstract empathy, but not concrete empathy. Concrete empathy can speak to a part but rarely, if ever, the whole of another’s experience and moral view. It is impossible to measure the moral views of others and therefore impossible to construct the original position.
The novel is an example that better critiques the distinction I make between the era of film/television and the eras prior to it. Novels, particularly first person novels which emphasize the protagonist’s emotional state, do create the same category of indwelling experience as TV. They result in the same category of abstract empathy. I do think there is a difference of degree in the amount of abstract empathy in novels compared to TV. Consequently, there is an increase in blank-slate thought and proto-Rawlsian philosophies in the post-printing press, but pre-film era. However, this increase is nowhere near the magnitude as the television era in either philosophy or general society.
Moving on, let’s consider Richard’s second question:
As you know, Rawls is just the latest in a long line of state-of-nature theorists, many of whom tend toward some blank-slate view of human nature. If the appeal of the Veil of Ignorance is driven by tv, by "a routine of technology" that hides human differences, then why did these earlier philosophies also catch on?
His first subquestion raises the point of interchangeable conceptions of human nature.
The only answer that occurs to me is that Rawls requires more interchangeable humans than Hobbes or Locke. Is that right?
I think that this distinction is definitely correct for Locke. Locke does have blank-slate tendencies, especially when arguing against heredity, divine right, and monarchy. Still, I believe Locke sees a pluralism of cultures or beliefs, whether by nature or nurture, that makes men non-interchangeable. To me, the Rawlsian step is to define the original position as something universally accessible to rational-thinking men. This presents a different solution than the bottom-up, emergent pluralism of Locke.
Hobbes is a more complex case. I definitely don’t believe that Hobbes requires humans to be interchangeable beyond certain political rights. The most famous description of political equality Hobbes uses is the following, from Leviathan:
“Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind; as that though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind then another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himselfe.
It’s a fascinating formulation of political equality that I’ve spent much time thinking and writing about. (https://www.fromthenew.world/p/the-morality-of-envy-is-a-remnant, https://www.fromthenew.world/p/dysfunction-and-dictatorship ). While it implies equality in certain political rights, I don’t think it affirms a modern “blank slate” understanding of human interchangeability. Hobbes explicitly states that there are men “manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind then another”, which is certainly a rejection of the blank slate vision.
In general, I don’t believe that moral egalitarianism, and especially political egalitarianism, are a TV phenomenon. I think there is a particular homogenizing and universalizing character to Rawlsian egalitarianism that makes it distinct from previous forms of political egalitarianism, such as Hobbes or Locke. The distinction between Marxism (as laid out by Marx) and modern interpretations of the socialist project is an interesting case study of this change over time. Joseph Heath has an excellent article on exactly this topic with a detailed intellectual history:
In summary, the asymmetric power between capital and labor was not seen as unjust due to the existence of inequality, but because of asymmetric political and economic leverage. It had a foundation of cultural polarization between capital and labor, not cultural similarity. Many Marxists, if not Marx himself, did not believe it was even possible for capitalists to understand them or empathize with them.
Once again, a true and understandable criticism of the original article is that the Rawlsian era is marked by a difference in degree rather than a difference in kind. I still believe that difference in degree matters. I believe that a similar shift in degree back towards concrete empathy, rather than abstract empathy, will be consequential for both philosophy and politics.